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E.E.O.C. v. ABERCROMBIE & FITCH STORES, INC.1—
REEXAMINING THE NOTICE REQUIREMENT IN
RELIGIOUS ACCOMMODATION CASES

by

J.L. Yranski Nasuti, MDiv, JD, LLM*

In recent years, the U.S. Supreme Court has addressed a
number of cases involving religious claims arising out of the
employment relationship. The Court’s unanimous decision in
the case of Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church v.
E.E.O.C. 2 recognized a ministerial exception that allowed a
religious organization to avoid liability for the violation of an
employee’s statutory workplace rights if the employee in
question was a “ministerial employee.” The more contentious
5-4 decision in the case of Burwell v. Hobby Lobby3 affirmed
an employer’s claim that government regulations, which
required employers (including for-profit corporations opposed
to the use of contraceptives for religious reasons) to provide
no-cost access to contraception on the grounds, were invalid
since they violated the Religious Freedom Restoration Act. 4
More recently, the Court, in the case of E.E.O.C. v.
Abercrombie & Fitch, Inc., considered the question of whether
a job applicant’s Title VII religious discrimination claim could
prevail even though the applicant had never informed the
employer that she needed a religious accommodation.
*Professor of Legal Studies in Business
Iona College, New Rochelle, New York
________________
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As in Hosanna-Tabor and Hobby Lobby, the party asserting the
religious claim prevailed. But, in this case that party was the
employee.
I. FACTS
Samantha Elauf was seventeen years old when she applied
for a sales job at an Abercrombie store in the Woodland Hills
Mall in Tulsa, Oklahoma.5 Elauf had purchased Abercrombie
clothes in the past and was familiar with the clothing brand.
Abercrombie, which self-identifies its brand as one that
“exemplifies a classic East Coast collegiate style of clothing,”6
was so committed to its image that it required all of its
employees to adhere to a “Look Policy.” Under the “Look
Policy,” employees were required to wear clothes that were, at
the very least, similar to those sold in the stores. The policy
also prohibited employees from wearing either black clothing
or caps. Any employee who failed to comply with the “Look
Policy” would be subject to “disciplinary action . . . up to and
including termination.”7
At the time, Elauf applied for the job, Abercrombie’s
marketing strategy was somewhat unique in that it did not rely
on advertising through traditional media outlets such as print
publications and television. It chose instead to create a
“holistically brand-based, sensory experience” for its target
customers when they entered an Abercrombie store. 8 It was
considered crucial to this strategy that the sales-floor
employees be more than just people who rang up purchases.
Abercrombie consistently referred to its sales staff as “models”
and expected them to project the Abercrombie experience for
its customers. It was Abercrombie’s belief that a “model” who
violated the “Look” fail[ed] to perform an essential function of
the position, and ultimately damage[d] the brand.”9
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When Elauf interviewed for the job, she was wearing
clothes that were consistent with the Abercrombie image . . .
except for the fact that she was also wearing a hijab.10 (Elauf
considered herself to be a Muslim and, since the age of 13, had
followed the example of her mother and worn a headscarf
whenever in public or in the presence of male strangers. 11 )
Although Elauf was unaware of the “Look Policy” when she
applied for the job, she did approach her friend, Farisa
Sepahvand, an Abercrombie employee, to find out whether
wearing a black headscarf would present a problem.
Sephavand, who did not herself wear a headscarf, discussed the
matter with Kalen McJilton, an assistant manager at the store
who was acquainted with Elauf. McJilton told Sephavand that
he thought Elauf could wear a headscarf so long as it was not
black. (Abercrombie models were required to wear clothing
similar to those sold by Abercrombie and Abercrombie did not
sell black clothing.)12
Elauf applied for the job and was interviewed by Healther
Cooke, the assistant manager in charge of recruiting,
interviewing and hiring new employees. Cooke, following
Abercrombie’s official interview guide, evaluated Elauf in
three categories: “appearance & sense of style,” whether the
applicant is “outgoing & promotes diversity,” and whether the
applicant has “sophistication & aspiration.”13 According to the
interview guide each candidate had to be rated on a 1-3 scale in
each category. In order to qualify for a position as a model, a
candidate had to receive a score of two or more in appearance
and a total score of more than five. Elauf received a score of
two in each category, which according to the “Model Group
Interview Guide” meant that she had met company’s
expectations and amounted to a recommendation that she be
hired.
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During the interview, Cooke never mentioned the “Look
Policy” by name to Elauf. She did, however, explain some of
the dress requirements including the requirements that the
models had to wear clothes similar to those sold by
Abercrombie and that they were not to wear heavy make-up or
nail polish. Elauf, in turn, never told Cooke that she was a
Muslim, never brought up the topic of the headscarf, never
indicated that she wore the headscarf for religious reasons, and
never asked for a religious accommodation.14 Later on Cooke
would admit in a deposition that she while she “did not know”
Elauf’s religion, she had “assumed that she was Muslim” and
“figured that was the religious reason why she wore her head
scarf.”15
Cooke had the authority to make hiring decisions for the
store in the Woodland Hills Mall without seeking the approval
of anyone else at Abercrombie. In this particular case, she
decided to first check with her store manager before making
the job offer to Elauf since she was not sure if Elauf’s
headscarf would conflict with the company’s “Look Policy.”
When the manager was unable to give her a definitive answer,
she contacted the Randall Johnson, the district manager, who
told her not to hire Elauf. In a deposition, Cooke testified that
she told Johnson that she thought Elauf was a very good
candidate. She also alleged that when she told Johnson that
Elauf wore a headscarf for what she believed were religious
reasons, he responded by saying “”You still can’t hire her
because someone can come in and paint themselves green and
say they were doing it for religious reasons and we can’t hire
him.””16 Cooke further claimed that she had informed Johnson
that she thought Elauf was a Muslim, a recognized religion,
that she wore the headscarf for religious reasons, and, that they
should hire Elauf. According to Cooke, Johnson continued to
instruct her not to extend a job offer.17
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Johnson would subsequently deny that he had been told that
Cooke thought Elauf wore the headscarf for religious reasons
or that he had made the remark about people painting
themselves green. 18 He testified that if there had been any
question about whether a hijab constituted a prohibited cap, he
would have contacted the Human Resources Department for
clarification. 19 But, he did state that he thought the wearing of
a hijab would violate the “Look Policy” and that “there was no
difference between a yarmulke, head scarf, “[o]r a ball cap or a
helmet for all that matters. It’s still a cap,” and if an applicant
asked to wear a ball cap for religious reasons, he “[s]till would
have denied them, yes, sir.””20
After her conversation with Johnson, and as per his
instructions, Cooke redid her original written evaluation of
Elauf and downgraded the “appearance and sense of style”
score to a 1—which lowered the overall score to a 5.21 The
altered score disqualified Elauf for a position at Abercrombie.
Elauf only found out that she would not be hired when her
friend, Sepahvand, told her that the district manager had
instructed Cooke not to offer her a position because of her
headscarf.
II. LOWER COURT DECISIONS
A. U.S. District Court
The E.E.O.C filed a lawsuit on behalf of Elauf and against
Abercrombie & Fitch, in the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of Oklahoma, alleging religious
discrimination based on Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 (42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) & (3) and Title I of the Civil
Rights Act of 1991 (42 U.S.C. § 1981a). Both parties filed
Motions for Summary Judgment. The E.E.O.C.’s motion was
based “on the issue of liability or, in the alternative, on one or
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more elements of its prima facie case and/or on Abercrombie’s
affirmative defense of undue hardship,” and Abercrombie’s
was based on the assertion that “the E.E.O.C. ha[d] not
established a prima facie case, and because an accommodation
for Elauf would cause Abercrombie undue hardship.”22
The District Court began its analysis by making three
observations about religious discrimination claims. The first
was that 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) only applied to those aspects of
religious observance and practice of the employee or
prospective that an employer was able to reasonably
accommodate without undue hardship on the conduct of the
employer’s business. The second was to indicate that the
applicable burden-shifting approach for this kind of case was
that of McDonald Douglas Corp. v. Green.23 And, the third
was to show how the Tenth Circuit had applied that burdenshifting approach in the case of Thomas v. National Ass’n of
Letter Carrier. 24 In Thomas, the plaintiff had the initial
burden of showing that: 1. the plaintiff had a bona fide
religious belief that conflicts with an employment requirement;
2. the plaintiff had informed the employer of this belief; and 3.
the plaintiff had not been hired because he or she failed to
comply with the employment requirement.25 The burden then
shifted to the defendant to: 1. conclusively rebut one or more
elements of the plaintiff’s prima facie case; 2. show that it had
offered a reasonably accommodation, or 3. show that it was
unable to accommodate the employee’s religious needs
reasonably without undue hardship. 26 The Tenth Circuit, in
Thomas, also noted that there was a significant difference in
the burden shifting approach for disability and religious
discrimination cases as opposed to other types of
discrimination cases:
In [an ADA or religious failure to
accommodate] case, the Congress has already
determined that a failure to offer a reasonable
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accommodation to an otherwise qualified
disabled employee is unlawful discrimination.
Thus, we use the burden-shifting mechanism,
not to probe the subjective intent of the
employer, but rather simply to provide a useful
structure by which the district court, when
considering a motion for summary judgment,
can determine whether the various parties have
advanced sufficient evidence to meet their
respective traditional burdens to prove or
disprove
the
reasonableness
of
the
accommodations offered or not offered.27
The District Court had no problem concluding that the
plaintiff met the requirements, articulated in both McDonald
Douglas and Thomas, for establishing a prima facie case.
There was evidence that Elauf wore the headscarf based on her
understanding of the Koran. The Abercrombie “Look Policy”
prohibited the wearing of head coverings. Abercrombie had
notice that the reason Elauf wore the headscarf was because of
a religious belief. Finally the defendant did not hire the
plaintiff because to wear a headscarf would be in violation of
the “Look Policy.”28
The defendant’s rebuttal of the plaintiff’s prima facie case
had centered on two issues. The first was whether the wearing
of a headscarf was based on a bona fide religious belief and
whether Elauf, in fact, wore her hijab for a religious reason.
The second was whether the notice requirement had been met.
In response to the first claim, the District Court cited three U.S.
Supreme Court cases. In 1953, the Supreme Court had held
that “it is no business of the courts to say . . . what is a religious
practice or activity.”29 Twelve year later, the Supreme Court
held that an action was a “bone fide religious belief” if it was
religious within the plaintiff’s own scheme of things and was
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sincerely held. 30 Thus, the individual’s assertion “that [her]
belief is an essential part of a religious faith must be given
great weight.”31 The most recent of the cited cases went even
further and held that if a person’s beliefs were religiously
based, it was not for the court to question whether those beliefs
were “derived from revelation, study, upbringing, gradual
evolution, or some source that appears entirely
incomprehensible.”32
It was Abercrombie’s claim that women wore hijabs for a
variety of non-religious reasons, including cultural and
nationalistic ones. The defendant also asserted that the Quran
did not explicitly require Islamic women to wear headscarves.
In response to the first assertion, the court noted that there was
nothing in the record to indicate that Elauf’s decision to begin
wearing the hijab when she was thirteen was based on any
reason other than her religious beliefs. As for the fact that the
Quran does not require women to wear head coverings, the
district court, citing a Seventh Circuit case,
[N]ote[d] that to restrict [Title VII claims] to
those practices which are mandated or
prohibited by a tenet of religion, would involve
the court in determining not only what are the
tenets of a particular religion, which by itself
perhaps would not be beyond the province of
the court, but would frequently require the
courts to decide whether a particular practice is
or is not required by the tenets of the religion.
We find such a judicial determination to be
irreconcilable with the warning issued by the
Supreme Court. 33
The District Court concluded that even though Elauf did not
consider Muslim women to be bad Muslims if they did not
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wear hijabs, she wore the hijab based on the Quran’s teaching
that women should be modest. As such, her wearing of the
hijab was based on a religious belief.
The District Court also dismissed Abercrombie’s challenge
to the sincerity of Elauf’s religious belief based on the fact that
she did not know the street address of her mosque, did not
regularly attend Friday services, and did not prayer five times a
day every day. In this matter, the court agreed with the Second
Court of Appeals that “it was appropriate, indeed necessary, for
a court to engage in an analysis of the sincerity—as opposed to
the verity—of someone’s religious beliefs in . . . the Title VII
context.” 34 It was legitimate to do a sincerity analysis “to
differentiat[e] between beliefs that are held as a matter of
conscience and those that are animated by motives of deception
and fraud.”35 The District Court limited its sincerity inquiry to
the question of whether Elauf believed that she was required to
wear the headscarf and not to whether she followed all of the
tenets of the Islamic faith. The only accommodation in this
case involved the wearing of a headscarf. And, the issue was
whether Elauf’s motivation was a matter of conscience or a
matter of deception and fraud. The District Court rejected
Abercrombie’s argument that Elauf’s sincerity was an issue of
credibility—and a matter properly decided by a trier of fact—
and concluded that there was nothing in the record to dispute
the fact that she wore the headscarf based on a bone fide
religious belief.
Abercrombie’s more interesting argument involved the
issue of whether, under the Civil Rights Act, the company
could be liable for failing to reasonably accommodate Elauf if
she had not explicitly notified the company that she needed a
religious accommodation to wear the headscarf. While the
Courts of Appeal in the Eighth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits
had ruled that the notice requirement could be satisfied if “the
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employer has enough information to make it aware there exits a
conflict between the individual’s religious practice or belief
and a requirement for applying for or performing a job,” 36 the
Tenth Circuit had not addressed this particular matter. The
Tenth Circuit had, however, acknowledged that notice was
essential to the interactive process leading to accommodation37
and that it was the employee who ordinarily provided the
employer with notice of a need for an accommodation.38 The
District Court concluded, “since the purpose of the notice
requirement was to facilitate the interactive process and
prevent ambush of an unwitting employer . . . it was enough
that the employer has notice an accommodation is needed.”39
Abercrombie did not need to receive an explicit request from
Elauf. In this instance, the fact, that Elauf wore her headscarf
to the interview and the assistant store manager who
interviewed her knew that the headscarf was worn for religious
reasons, meant that Abercrombie could not rebut the second
element of the prima facie case. Abercrombie had notice that
Elauf wore a headscarf based on her religious belief.
Abercrombie’s final argument was that even if it did not
rebut the prima facie case, it should still prevail on the grounds
that it would be an “undue hardship” for the retail firm to
accommodate Elauf.
Noting that an “undue hardship”
constitutes something “more than a de minimus cost”40 and that
the proffered hardship must be actual and not the result of mere
speculation,41 the District Court concluded that Abercrombie’s
unsubstantiated claim that allowing Elauf to wear a headscarf
would have a negative impact on the brand, sales and
compliance failed to meet the burden of establishing an undue
hardship and denied Abercrombie’s motion for summary
judgment. The E.E.O.C.’s motion for a partial summary
judgment was granted and the case went to trial to determine
the issue of damages. The jury awarded $20,000 in damages
but denied prospective injunctive relief.
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B. U.S. Court of Appeals (10th Circuit)
In its appeal to the Tenth Circuit, Abercrombie argued that
allowing Elauf to wear a headscarf would create an undue
hardship for the company and require an accommodation that
was not based on a sincerely held religious belief. In addition,
and, more importantly, the appellant claimed that the company
should not be liable for failing to make an accommodation
since Elauf had not properly notified Abercrombie that she
wore the headscarf for religious reasons and that she needed a
religious accommodation. In its de novo review of the record,
the appellate court reversed the trial court’s denial of
Abercrombie’s motion for summary judgment, reversed the
granting of the E.E.O.C.’s motion for a summary judgment,
and remanded the case to the district court instructing it to
vacate its judgment and enter one in favor of Abercrombie.
The Circuit Court began by examining the meaning of the
term “religion” as it is understood in the context of Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act. According to the E.E.O.C. Compliance
Manual, religion is broadly defined under Title VII and it
“includes not only traditional organized religions such as
Christianity, Judaism, Hinduism, and Buddhism, but also
religious beliefs that are new, uncommon, not part of a formal
church or sect, only subscribed to by a small number of people,
or that seem unreasonable to others.”42 But, the Compliance
Manual also recognizes that “[w]hether a practice is religious
depends on the employee’s motivation. The same practice
might be engaged in by one person for religious reasons and by
another person for purely secular reasons.”43 The Circuit Court
identified two significant implications stemming from the
E.E.O.C.’s general principles for the enforcement of Title VII
proscriptions against religious discrimination. The first was
that it was possible for an applicant or employee to engage in a
practice that was associated with a particular religion, but to do
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so for cultural or other reasons that were not religious. 44 The
second was that unless a person’s conduct is based on religious
beliefs that have “a distinctive content related to ultimate ideas
about life, purpose, and death,”45 that conduct is outside of the
“protective ambit” of Title VII.
The Circuit Court went on to explain that in order to
successfully make a claim for a religious accommodation, there
must be a true conflict between the employee’s religious
practice and the employer’s neutral policy. The employee must
consider the religious practice in question to be inflexible and
required by his or her religion.46 On the other hand, there is no
actual conflict, and therefore no need for an accommodation, if
the employee neither feels obliged to adhere to the practice nor
considers it to be an inflexible practice.
The appellate court held that the discussion about whether
an employee has a religious belief or practice that must to be
accommodated was one that needed to be initiated by the
employee and not the employer. It cited the E.E.O.C.
publication, Best Practices for Eradicating Religious
Discrimination in the Workplace, which cautioned that the
employer should “avoid assumptions or stereotypes about what
constitutes a religious belief or practice or what type of
accommodation is appropriate.”47 This would include insuring
that its managers and employees were trained not to make
stereotypical assumptions based on a person’s religious dress
and grooming practices. It was only after the employee puts
the employer on notice of a religious conflict that the employer
may ask for additional information to determine whether an
accommodation was necessary and available.48
The Tenth Circuit used its own modified version of the
McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting approach for religious
accommodation cases as it had set forth in Thomas v. National
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Ass’n of Letter Carriers. 49 That test was the same one
presented by the District Court. (In order to establish a prima
facie case the employee had to show that he or she had a
religious belief that conflicted with an employment
requirement; that the employee informed the employer of that
belief; and that the employer either failed to hire or fired the
employee because of the employee’s failure to comply with an
employment requirement.) The appellate court, however,
focused on the second element of the employee’s prima facie
case and concluded that Elauf had not informed her employer
directly of a particular religious need to wear a headscarf. The
E.E.O.C. had tried to argue that there were additional
permissible ways for an employer to be put on notice that the
employee had a particular religious belief. The court, however,
found that even if an employer had some notice that a religious
belief existed, the employer would still lack knowledge as to
whether the employee considered the religious practice to be
inflexible and in conflict with an employment requirement,
and, therefore, in need of a reasonable accommodation. 50 In
this case, “there is no genuine dispute of material fact that no
Abercrombie agent responsible for, or involved in, the hiring
process had such actual knowledge—from any source—that
Ms. Elauf’s practice of wearing a hijab stemmed from her
religious beliefs and that she needed an accommodation for
it.”51 The Court of Appeals concluded that most that could be
said was that the person who conducted the interview assumed
that Elauf “wore her hijab for religious reasons and felt
religiously obliged to do so—thus creating a conflict with
Abercrombie’s clothing policy.” 52 The assistant manager’s
subsequent call to the regional manager to find out if wearing a
hijab for religious reasons would violate the “Look Policy” was
also derived from assumptions about Elauf and not on any
actual knowledge that an accommodation would be necessary.
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Much of the Circuit Court’s rationale for reversing the
lower court’s decision was based on its conclusion that an
employer was only permitted to engage in an interactive
religion-accommodation discussion with the employee after the
employer had actual knowledge that the employee had a
sincere religious belief and that that belief required the
employee to follow a religious practice that was in conflict
with the employment requirements. 53 One of the court’s
concerns was that if the employer initiated a conversation with
an applicant or employee about possible religious beliefs
(without the topic being brought up by the
applicant/employee), it could be viewed as non-job related
inquiry and, therefore, in violation of the Civil Rights Act.
Another concern was that in religious accommodation cases,
the employee needed to establish that the actual motivation for
following a particular practice was, in fact, of a religious
nature. While some people might follow a practice for
religious reasons, that does not mean that everyone following
that practice is similarly motivated. “A person’s religion is not
like his sex or race—obvious at a glance. Even if [the person]
wears a religious symbol, such as a cross or a yarmulke, this
may not pinpoint [that person’s] particular beliefs and
observances.” 54 An employer need not be familiar with all
traditionally religious practices and should not be required to
speculate on whether an employee follows such a practice for a
religious reason. “Religion is a uniquely personal and
individual matter.”55 It is the duty of the employee to give the
employer fair warning of employment practices that interfere
with his or her religion . . . and, in addition, to inform the
employer that the employee considers the religious practice to
be inflexible and in need of a reasonable accommodation by
the employer.
According to the Tenth Circuit, the employee’s affirmative
obligation to inform the employer of a need for a religious
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accommodation is met when the employee or applicant
“provide[s] enough information to make the employer aware
that there exists a conflict between the individual’s religious
practice or belief and a requirement for applying for or
performing the job.” 56 The court saw no justification for
granting deference to the E.E.O.C.’s contention that the plain
language in its manual could be disregarded when the
employer had notice of a religious belief and the need for a
religious accommodation from a source that did not involve an
explicit communication from the employee. It concluded
instead that under a natural reading of the regulation in
question, “the employer’s obligation to provide a reasonable
religious accommodation would be triggered only when
applicants or employees explicitly informed the employer of
their conflicting religious practice and need for an
accommodation.”57
In a separate opinion that concurred in part and dissented in
part, Justice Ebel stated that while the trial court should not
have granted the E.E.O.C.’s motion for summary judgment, it
also should have left it for a jury to decide whether
Abercrombie was liable for religious discrimination.
His
opinion was based on three conclusions. The first was that the
majority’s second requirement for establishing a prima facie
case (which required showing that Elauf had informed the
employer that its “Look Policy” conflicted with her religious
beliefs) was inflexible and made no sense under the law and
the circumstances of the case. 58 The second was that the
plaintiff had, in fact, established a prima facie claim that
Abercrombie had failed to reasonably accommodate Elauf’s
religious practice.59 And, finally, summary judgment in favor
of either party was inappropriate since Abercrombie’s evidence
contradicted the prima facie evidence and created a triable
issue of fact whether the defendant had failed to accommodate
the plaintiff’s religious practice of wearing a headscarf.60
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C. U.S. SUPREME COURT DECISION
1. Majority Opinion
The U.S. Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Tenth
Circuit and remanded the case for further consideration. The
majority opinion was delivered by Justice Scalia and joined by
Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Kennedy, Ginsburg, Breyer,
Sotomayer, and Kagan.
Justice Alito filed a separate
concurring opinion and Justice Thomas filed an opinion
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
The majority decision focused on one issue--whether an
applicant’s Title VII disparate treatment claim, which was
based on an employer’s refusal to hire the applicant in order to
avoid having to make a reasonable accommodation for a
religious practice, could succeed if the applicant had failed to
inform the employer of the need for an accommodation.61 The
majority opinion rejected Abercrombie’s claim that the
employer had to have “actual knowledge” of the applicant’s
need for an accommodation and focused instead on whether the
employee’s need for an accommodation was a motivating
factor behind the employer’s refusal to hire the applicant.
Not surprisingly, Scalia began the opinion with a textual
analysis of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. For the purposes
of the statute, “religion” “includ[ed] all aspects of religious
observance and practice, as well as belief, unless the employer
demonstrates that he is unable to reasonably accommodate to”
a “religious observance or practice without undue hardship on
the conduct of the employer’s business.” 62 In a disparatetreatment claim, the plaintiff must be able to establish three
things: 1. the employer “fail[ed] . . . to hire” the applicant; 2.
“because of”; 3. “such individual’s . . . religion” (including the
applicant’s religious practice.) In this case “Abercrombie (1)
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failed to hire Elauf and since the parties concede that (if she
sincerely believed that wearing a headscarf was required by her
religion) Elauf’s wearing of a headscarf was (2) a “religious
practice”, then the only issue to be decided was whether she
was not hired (3) “because of” her religious practice.”63
The majority opinion noted that while many antidiscrimination statutes include the phrase “because of,” they do
not necessarily use it in the same way. In most instances, the
phrase can, minimally, be interchanged with the traditional
standard of “but-for” causation. That, however, is not what
occurs in Title VII cases where the meaning of the phrase is
relaxed to the extent that it would prohibit allowing a protected
characteristic to be a “motivating” factor in an employment
decision. 64 As such, the Court concluded that the use of
“because of” in 42 U.S.C. §2000e-2(a)(1) “links the forbidden
consideration to each of the verbs preceding it; an individual’s
actual religion practice may not be a motivating factor in
failing to hire, in refusing to hire, and so on.”65
The Court specifically differentiated Title VII cases from
cases brought under the Americans with Disability Act of 1990
(ADA). 66 Under the ADA, the requirement to make
“reasonable accommodations” only applies when the employer
has actual knowledge of the applicant’s physical or mental
limitations.67 A similar knowledge requirement is missing for
Title VII cases. Under Title VII, knowledge and motivation
are considered to be separate concepts. In a disparate treatment
case, actions taken by an employer may result in liability when
they are based on the employer’s motives regardless of what
the employer actually knows about the applicant.
Consequently, an employer would be liable if the motive for
not hiring an applicant is to avoid making a reasonable
accommodation—even if that action is based on nothing more
than an “unsubstantiated suspicion” that an accommodation
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would be needed. Conversely, an employer who had actual
knowledge of the need for an accommodation would not be
liable if the reason for not hiring the applicant was not
motivated by a desire to avoid accommodation.68
The Supreme Court announced a straightforward rule for
disparate-treatment cases. “An employer may not make an
applicant’s religious practice, confirmed or otherwise, a factor
in employment decisions.”69 This was different from the rule
followed in the Tenth Circuit that placed the burden on the
applicant to inform the employer that there was a religious
conflict between the religious practice and the job
requirements. Scalia characterized that rule as the product of a
flawed statutory interpretation. The lower court had simply
added words to the law in order to get a desired result.
Although Congress could have included the requirement in the
statute, it decided not to do so. It chose instead to prohibit
actions “taken with the motive of avoiding the need for
accommodating a religious practice.” 70 (In dictum, the
Supreme Court noted that it would leave for future
consideration the issue of whether the applicant must show that
the employer, at the very least, suspected that the practice in
question was a religious practice in order for the motive
requirement to be met. The Court was not required to consider
it in this instance, since Abercrombie knew, or at least
suspected, that the practice was religious.)
The majority opinion concluded with a rejection of
Abercrombie’s claim that the case was inaccurately argued as a
disparate-treatment case rather than a disparate-impact claim.
The Court presented two reasons for its conclusion. The first
was based on the fact that the definition of religion in Title VII
included “all aspects of religious observance and practice, as
well as belief.” 71 Since a religious practice is a protected
characteristic under the statute, discrimination based on that
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practice would in fact raise a valid disparate treatment claim.
The second reason was that the Court rejected the employer’s
claim that disparate-treatment can only apply to cases where
the employer’s policies treat religious practices less favorably
than similar secular practices. A neutral policy might result in
intentional discrimination. But, that is not enough. Under
Title VII religious practices are given “favored treatment,
affirmatively obligating employers not “to fail or refuse to hire
or discharge any individual . . . because of such individual’s”
“religious observance and practice.””72 Abercrombie’s policy
prohibiting headgear was otherwise neutral with regard to all
employees.
However, without an accommodation, the
otherwise-neutral policy discriminated against Elauf because of
her religion.
2. Concurring Opinion
Justice Alito’s concurring opinion agreed that Title VII did
not impose the Tenth Circuit’s interpretation of the notice
requirement on the applicant. He did, however, assert that
Title VII provided for a knowledge requirement by the
employer. It seemed obvious to Alito that “an employer cannot
be held liable for taking an adverse action because of an
employee’s religious practice unless the employer knows that
the employee engages in the practice for a religious reason.”73
Alito’s concern with the majority’s approach was that an
unknowing employer could be held liable for not hiring an
applicant even though the employer honestly thought that the
applicant wore the scarf for secular reasons and did not know
the applicant was a Muslim. He suggested that it was “entirely
reasonable to understand the prohibition against an employer’s
taking an adverse action because of a religious practice to mean
that an employer may not take an adverse action because of a
practice that the employer knows to be religious.”74 Intentional
discrimination is “blameworthy conduct” for which an
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employer should be held liable only when there is a knowledge
requirement. Alito’s concern was that an employer would not
even know to begin to consider accommodating a practice if
there was no knowledge that the practice was of a religious
nature.
Alito concluded by taking exception with the majority’s
assertion that the plaintiff had the burden of proving that the
employer failed to accommodate the religious practice. 75 He
argued instead that Title VII specifically states “it shall be an
unlawful employment practice for an employer . . . to fail or
refuse to hire . . . any individual . . . because of [any aspect of]
such individual’s . . . religious . . . practice . . . unless an
employer demonstrates that he is unable to reasonably
accommodate to [the] employee’s or prospective employee’s
religious . . . practice . . . without undue hardship on the
conduct of the employer’s business.” 76 (Emphasis added by
Alito.) While he concedes that the burden is on the plaintiff to
prove that the employer failed to or refused to hire the
employee because of a religious practice, he also argues that
the burden of proof is on the employer to demonstrate that it
was unreasonable to accommodate the employee’s religious
practice without undue hardship.

3. Opinion Dissenting in Part and Concurring in Part
Justice Thomas concurred with the majority only to the
extent that he agreed that there were two causes of action under
Title VII—a disparate treatment claim and a disparate impact
claim. His far more serious disagreement with the majority
rested on his belief that the Abercrombie case was, in fact, a
disparate impact case.
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According to Thomas, intentional discrimination required
the employer to treat a person less favorably than others
because of a protected trait.77 Disparate-impact discrimination,
on the only hand, “involve[d] employment practices that are
facially neutral in their treatment of different groups but that in
fact fall more harshly on one group than another and cannot be
justified by business necessity.” 78 It followed then that
Abercrombie did not engage in “intentional discrimination”
since it had a neutral dress code policy that did not treat
religious practices less favorably than similar secular practices.
Absent an accommodation, on the other hand, its policy would
fall more harshly on someone who wore headscarves as a
religious practice.
Thomas’ problem with the majority opinion was that he
thought it ignored the relevant statutory text and twisted the
meaning of “intentional treatment” to include refusing to give a
religious applicant “favored treatment.” 79 Thomas contended
that inserting the Title VII definition of religion 80 onto Title
VII’s specific charge that it is illegal “to fail or refuse to hire . .
. any individual . . . because of such individual’s . . . religion”81
did not resolve the question of whether Elauf had been rejected
“because of her religious beliefs.” Thomas identified two
possible ways of applying the “because of one’s religion”
provision in disparate treatment cases. One would make it
illegal to base an employment decision on the religious nature
of the particular practice of the employee. The other would
make it illegal to make an employment decision based on the
fact that the employee’s practice happens to be religious. 82
The problem with the second approach is that it would make
the employer liable even though the employer had no
discriminatory motive. For Thomas this would result in a
strict liability situation that would preclude the employer from
asserting a defense that the employer had no idea that the
particular practice was, in fact, religious.83
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While Thomas did not accuse the majority of creating a
strict liability option for cases alleging intentional religious
discrimination, he did contend that the Court had opted for a
compromise that would punish employers “who refuse to
accommodate applicants under neutral policies when they act
“with the motive of avoiding accommodation.””84 As a result,
the employer in a religious discrimination case based on
disparate treatment case might have to demonstrate that his or
her actions constituted something more than equal treatment.85
Thomas applauded the majority for “put[ting] to rest the notion
that Title VII creates a freestanding religious-accommodation
claim” but disagreed with the Court’s “creat[ion] in its stead
[of] an entirely new form of liability: the disparate-treatmentbased-on-equal-treatment claim.”86

D. CONCLUSIONS
During oral arguments, Justice Alito presented a
hypothetical to the attorney for Abercrombie & Fitch. Four
people show up for a job interview. One is a Sikh man wearing
a turban. The second is a Hasidic man wearing a hat. The
third is an Islamic woman wearing a hijab. And, the fourth is a
Catholic nun wearing a habit. Would the applicants have an
affirmative obligation to explain to the employer that they
dressed the way they did for religious reasons? And, if they
did not provide that information to the employer, would the
employer (assuming that the applicants might need some kind
of a religious accommodation) be liable under Title VII for
refusing to hire them in order to avoid possible accommodation
issues?
The Tenth Circuit clearly thought that a job applicant had an
affirmative obligation to inform a prospective employer that
there was a need for a reasonable accommodation based on
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religious beliefs. If the applicant failed to give that information
to the employer, the employer would not have an obligation to
even raise the issue of reasonable accommodations. Under the
Supreme Court’s ruling, an applicant could claim disparate
treatment even though the applicant failed to provide the
employer with actual knowledge of the need for a reasonable
accommodation. The only thing that the applicant would have
to prove is that the employer’s assumption or suspicion of a
possible need to accommodate was the motivating factor in
denying employment. The Court suggested, at least in oral
arguments, that the best practice in situations where the
employer has reason to believe that a particular applicant might
need a reasonable accommodation would be for the employer
to inform the applicant of all the job requirements and then to
ask if the applicant would have any problem complying with
them. In the Abercrombie case, the person who conducted the
interview suspected that Elauf wore the headscarf for religious
reasons. And, even though she told Elauf some of the
particulars about “The Look” policy, she never mentioned that
Abercrombie models were prohibited from wearing caps or
black clothing. As far as the applicant was concerned, there
was no reason to ask for a religious accommodation. What the
assistant manager should have done instead was to inform
Elauf all of the particulars of “The Look” policy (including the
prohibition regarding caps) and then to have asked whether she
would have any problem complying with the policy. 87 If Elauf
had said that she had no problems with the requirements, then
the employer would have had no obligation to enter into a
discussion about a religious accommodation. If, on the other
hand, Elauf had informed the interviewer that she had a
problem because she wore her headscarf for religious reasons,
she would have put the employer on notice that there was a
need for an accommodation.
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In this particular case, the Supreme Court never had to
address the question of whether it was possible for
Abercrombie to reasonably accommodate Elauf’s need to wear
a hijab. The legal issue was not whether the employer had
refused the applicant’s request for a reasonable
accommodation. It was simply whether the employer’s
suspicions that the applicant might need a religious
accommodation constituted sufficient notice to meet the second
prong of employee’s burden of proof in a disparate treatment
case. The Abercrombie case affirmed that an applicant could
prevail, even though the applicant had not informed the
employer of the need for a religious accommodation, if the
applicant can show that the motivating factor in the employer’s
decision not to hire the person was the possibility of having to
make a religious accommodation. When Justice Scalia
announced the Court’s decision from the bench, he indicated
that it was an easy decision. “Title VII forbids adverse
employment decisions made with a forbidden motive whether
this motive derives from actual knowledge, a well-founded
suspicion or merely a hunch.”88
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